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Abstract
Using data of Italian public healthcare providers over years 2001 through 2008, we evaluate the
impact of two policies adopted by Italian Regions (i.e., States) to cope with increasing medical
malpractice costs using a Difference-in-Difference specification. We assess the impact of the
policies on premiums paid and legal expenditures. The first policy consisted in collecting in-
formation and monitoring both compensation requests and any legal action related to a medical
malpractice claim against a public healthcare provider. The second policy is a switch from pri-
vate to public insurance for damages up to 500,000 euros combined with a centralized-regional
contracting out in the private insurance market for damages in excess of 500,000 euros. Both
policies represent attempts to cope with multiple agency problems within the public sector. Our
results show that the impact of central monitoring in malpractice claims trend can reduce up
to 29% the premiums paid for the treated providers, while the effect is obviously stronger for
public insurance (41%). We control for the effects of the latter also on the trend of legal expen-
ditures as proxy for common pool behaviors which do not result from our data. Validity tests
show that our results are not driven by a decreasing trend affecting the insurance expenditures
of the analyzed units before the policies’ introduction.
JEL codes: I18, G22, K32.
Keywords: Medical Errors, Medical Malpractice Premium, Legal Expenditures, Difference in
Difference.
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1 Introduction
Soaring expenditures due to medical malpractice have become a major policy concern in both private
and public healthcare systems because of the rising costs of medical malpractice insurance premi-
ums, compensation amounts, and defensive medicine (OECD (2006)). However, the widespread
increase in premiums can bite public healthcare systems more than private, due to soft budget con-
straints problems which often characterize the public system. There is an interplay of multiple
agency problems when medical malpractice insurance is acquired by a public agent from the pri-
vate market.1 The public agency in charge of bargaining with the private insurance is one layer of
government (generally the provider of the healthcare services) which might not have adequate in-
centives to fully internalize the bargaining (and contract) costs compared to the layer of government
(generally the State) which has to pay the final bill. Related to this, there may be lack of incentives
for the public agency bargaining with the private insurer to acquire adequate information on the
service risks the public is contracting out to the private. For instance, as medical malpractice is
concerned, a public hospital could not invest appropriate resources in collecting information on its
own exposure to risk, both in terms of claims’ frequency and awarded compensations.
The State has two options to cope with this framework: first it can bypass the agency problem
by directly providing public insurance coverage, which, in first-best world, is known to be theoreti-
cally more efficient (Arrow and Lind (1970)); second, it can try to collect and spread information on
malpractice to curb the lack of incentives that characterizes providers in raising their level knowl-
edge. The latter solution, which could be linked to a process of budget hardening, should work
as an incentive on the basis of a I-know-that-you-know-that-I-know-that-you-know game between
the State and its suppliers. Its rationale lays in making both the State and counterparts more in-
formed, and consequently, for instance, better able to work out efficient contracts and policies. This
is particularly important when insurance contracts need to follow the process of public procurement
auctions.2
In this paper we analyze the case for a higher level of State involvement in medical malpractice
insurance and monitoring when the healthcare system is mainly public. We implement a Difference-
in-Difference strategy using Italian data at the public provider level from 2001 to 2008 to evaluate 1)
the relative efficiency of Regions (an administrative level equivalent to States)3 oriented as opposed
to market oriented solutions in terms of affordability of malpractice premiums (public insurance),
and 2) the impact of a regional monitoring activity on the medical liability insurance premiums paid
by the public healthcare providers, with the counterpart typically a private insurance provider. We
1The same argument can be used for the contracting out of other services.
2For a political economy evaluation of better quality public auctions – more bidders, higher rebates, and mobility of
bidders, among the others – see Coviello and Gagliarducci (2010), who use data on Italian municipalities.
3For a matter of simplicity, in this paper we use Regions and States interchangeably.
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exploit the adoption of two medical malpractice related policies, given that they were introduced
only in some Regions and in different years.
In particular, the monitoring policy is implemented by a regional monitoring system that col-
lects data on both the number of compensation claims and legal action related to malpractice litiga-
tion. Adopting this system, Regions collect information on civil and criminal claims against public
healthcare providers operating in their jurisdictions, from the stage of filing a suit to the end of trial,
or to a settlement: eight Regions out of twenty-one have chosen this approach between 1997 and
2008. Within a system where each public provider can contract out its risk to the private sector, an
increase in available information on malpractice could, for instance, have a positive impact on the
public procurement procedure, since also the private insurer knows that the principal (State) knows.
The public insurance solution has been adopted by two Regions, which modeled the malpractice
insurance plan according to a “mixed” scheme. Adopting Regions provide full coverage to their
hospitals for damages up to 500,000 euros.4 The healthcare providers are required to contribute to
the pooled insurance. The private insurers are then called in for coverage in excess of the damage
liability, so that the private insurer will apply a deduction of 500,000 euros, and the insurance
contract is signed between the Region and the private company following a centralized bargaining
process typically based on public procurement auctions. While the pros of this solution should be
apparent (a drop in paid premiums and a reduction of transactions costs when the contracting out
is in place), it is not always easy to devise empirical evaluation of the cons. If the pooled risks are
managed without adequate monitoring, it could trigger higher frequency of malpractice claims due
to a watering down of precaution standards. In order to control for this side effect, we devise an
impact evaluation of adopting public insurance on legal expenditures per provider. A significant
increase in legal expenditures could be read as an increase in compensation requests. Finally, we
argue that rough cost-benefits calculations are needed when considering a public insurance solution.
Obviously, if on average Regions end up paying more in compensations for malpractice claims
than it would cost them to pay a private insurer, then this private solution would still be the more
convenient option. It is impossible to make accurate evaluations for our case study.
Our main results from the Difference-in-Difference estimation show that both policies have an
impact on insurance premiums paid by public healthcare providers: the monitoring policy decreases
up to 29% of the premiums paid, while the switch to public insurance plus centralized contracting
out decreased them up to 40%. Legal expenditures do not seem to be systematically affected by
the implemented policies, but a positive coefficient is associated to the introduction of public insur-
ance. The findings are robust to the introduction of covariates which could potentially explain the
4One of the two Regions, Piemonte, sets a deductible equal to 1,500 euros, which can be considered as negligible
given the average granted compensation in the same Region was 27,575 euros on average- data for 2005-2009. See
Amaral-Garcia and Grembi (2011).
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different trends in premiums among structures and Regions: for instance the migrations of patients
to structures behold to have higher qualitative standards. Results are also robust to placebo test such
as the introduction of “fake” policies which confirm that our results are not driven by a decreasing
trend in premiums or legal expenditures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides reference to the literature mainly related to
our research question.Section 3 lays out the institutional framework and our econometric strategy.
Section 4 describes our dataset. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature Review
The causes of the last decades’ skyrocketing increase of the insurance premiums for medical liability
have been addressed by many works and according to different perspectives. Insurance companies
blame legal professionals (i.e. with incentives to file ungrounded claims) and the inefficiency of the
legal system (e.g. lottery-like compensations); lawyers blame the insurance companies (e.g. inad-
equate adjustments of the reserves); and physicians/hospitals blame both insurance companies (i.e.
unavailable or prohibitive insurance coverage) and the legal system (e.g. amounts of compensation
awards) (see, for instance, AMA (2011)). Although several authors have tried to link the premiums’
growth or the decisions of private insurance companies to withdraw from the market of medical
liability to specificity of malpractice claims (e.g. Mello (2006), it has been difficult to establish such
a link. As stated by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), given the available information, it
is not clear whether or not the affordability and the availability crisis affecting the insurance market
for malpractice at least in the U.S. is related to insurance cycles rather than to frequency of malprac-
tice claims or to compensations of iatrogenic damages awarded (GAO (2003a), GAO (2003b), and
GAO (2003c)).
Governments reacted to the policy challenge related to medical malpractice according to the
type of their healthcare system by taking initiatives to lower premiums paid and reduce cream-
skimming distortions in medical practice (i.e., negative defensive medicine, see Danzon (2000)).
In countries such as the U.S., where the healthcare system is mainly private, States adopted legal
reforms shaping the liability system, such as caps on the amount of damages awarded in cases of
medical malpractice, which have been among the most popular types of reform (e.g., see Sloan
(1985); Williams and Mello (2006); Kessler (2011)).5 Exploiting the variation in interventions
across U.S. States, several studies estimate the impact of legal reforms on malpractice premiums,
malpractice claims frequency, award payments, or defensive medicine, to name the main outcomes
of interest (e.g., see Mello and Kachalia (2010); US-CBO (2004); Danzon, Epstein, and Johnson
(2004); Thorpe (2004); Kilgore, Morrisey, and Nelson (2006); Nelson III, Morrisey, and Kilgore
5See Avraham (2010) for an updated list of reforms in the U.S. States.
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(2007)).6 Most of these studies have identified caps on noneconomic damages as the most effective
reform. Following the introduction of noneconomic damage caps, medical malpractice premiums—
either at the State or at the individual physician level—usually fall. In some cases, States sponsored
forms of physicians’ self-insurance (bedpan mutuals) which eventually ended up with an important
role in the market for medical liability (Mello and Brennan (2003)).7
In countries with mainly public healthcare systems, such as most European countries, rising
malpractice costs have often induced governments to replace private with public insurance. In some
case, such as Sweden’s, this shift to public insurance was accompanied by the adoption of a no
fault liability system,8 while in others, such as for the U.K., an enterprise fault liability system
was adopted. The risk of individual physicians directly employed by the National Health System
(NHS) was transfered to the NHS hospitals (see Fenn, Gray, and Rickman (2004)) and the latter
were subsequently covered by a public insurance scheme managed by the NHS Litigation Authority
(NHSLA).9 The English case study pinpoints the importance of the principal (NHS) control on its
agents (hospitals and their employees), since public providers have limited incentives to take effi-
cient levels of care. Yet, estimations of side-effects consequences for the public sector are difficult,
because the reform was implemented throughout the entire system.
3 Institutional framework
3.1 The Italian HealthCare System
The Italian National Health System provides universal coverage to citizens.10 The current organiza-
tion and management of the Italian NHS is done at three levels: at the central level, by the national
State; at the regional level, by each Region; within each Region, by population-based local health
units (LHUs) (Aziende Sanitarie Locali) “independent” hospitals (IHs)(Aziende Ospedaliere), re-
search hospitals (RHs)(Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico)- essential to perform
research and provide assistance with specific pathologies-, and, in case a medical school is present,
6For the assessment of the link between malpractice pressure and treatment decisions, with specific reference to the
costs of defensive medicine, see Kessler and McClellan (1996) and Kessler and McClellan (2002).
7See for instance the case of the Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA), which argues that in 2003 a share
equal to the 60% of the insurance market for physician liability was run by other than “commercial” companies. The
number was equal to 40% for the hospitals’ liability (PIIA (2003)).
8For an updated report on the Swedish public insurance plan see at —link on sweden—.
9The public insurance formula—the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST)—pools malpractice risks of pub-
lic structures and this process took place initially with hospitals left free to set their deductibles but after 2002 the NHSLA
provided a full coverage for claims (see Fenn, Rickman, and Gray (2007) and Fenn, Gray, Rickman, Vencappa, Rivero,
and Lotti (2010)).
10Healthcare is mainly provided by public entities and citizens are not allowed to opt out from the system and search
private healthcare only (Lo Scalzo, Donatini, Orzella, Cicchetti, Profili, and Maresso (2009)).
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by teaching hospitals (THs)(Policlinici Universitari and Aziende Ospedaliere Universitarie)(France
and Taroni (2005); Fiorentini, Lippi Bruni, and Ugolini (2008); Lo Scalzo, Donatini, Orzella, Cic-
chetti, Profili, and Maresso (2009)).
The Central state defines the minimum (national) standards of health care (Livelli Essenziali
di Assistenza-LEA) that Regions must provide to their residents. Additionally, it partially funds
19 regions and 2 autonomous provinces (Provincia Autonoma di Trento and Provincia Autonoma
di Bolzano) through an equalizing fund. This fund, together with regional revenues, accounts for
financing the regional health care expenditures (France, Taroni, and Donatini (2005)). Regional
Governments are in charge for the entire healthcare budget and are responsible for its management
to both their residents and the National State, as in a decentralized system. Regions are responsible,
among other things, for ensuring the delivery of the healthcare, for the allocation of resources to
the healthcare providers, and for the “accreditation ” of public and private health providers with the
system (CERGAS, SEVERAL years).
Regions are free to regulate and finance health care services additional to the required LEA
(Fiorentini, Lippi Bruni, and Ugolini (2008)) and they can implement different healthcare manage-
ment schemes, to the point that several authors have stated that in Italy there are 21 health care
systems.11 Each regional health care system is organized in LHUs , IHs, RHs and THs, and private
institutions. LHUs are population-based care organizations that provide primary medical services
and coordinate non-emergency admissions to hospitals in their geographical area. LHUs provide
medical services through hospitals they own and IHs, RHs, and THs.12 The IHs are essentially
structured like the British National Health System’s Trusts (Anessi Pessina, Cantu, and Jommi
(2004)). Patients are covered by health plans provided by LHUs according to their place of resi-
dence even though they can also choose to receive hospital care from a hospital that does not belong
neither to their LHU area nor to their region of residence. Therefore, a proxy for the health care
11The current decentralized structure of the Italian Health System is the product of several reforms which starting from
the Nineties tried to make the Regional governments more fiscal responsible, coping with soft-budget constraint problems
(Bordignon and Turati (2009)) on one side, and to make the overall mainly public system more competitive and efficient.
The reforms introduced managerialism, fiscal tools for decentralization and quasi-market mechanisms (Fattore (1999);
Jommi, Cantu, and Anessi-Pessina (2001); France, Taroni, and Donatini (2005)). In the aftermath of these reforms,
the number of IHs increased while the number of LHUs decreased as Regions were trying to reshape their own health
care governance, especially in those realities characterized by a stronger preference for competition (CERGAS, 2004).
In 1992, before the reforms took place, there were 659 LHUs, they were reduced to 228 in 1995 and further reduced
to 146 in 2010. LHUs’ dimension care vary substantially: in some case a LHU can cover a municipalities, for bigger
municipalities we have generally more than one LHUs, but in some case there might be just one LHU which cover an
entire Region such as in Valle d’Aosta. As for IHs, in 1995 there were 81 IHs. The total number of IHs increased to 97
in 2001 to suffer a decrease to 82 in 2010. See Carbone, Ferre, and Liotta (2010) for more details - in Italian.
12Hospitals other than those managed directly by the LHUs are paid by Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) tariffs. See
Anessi Pessina, Cantu, and Jommi (2004).
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system quality can be provided by the mobility rates: internal mobility when migration takes place
within the region of residence, and external mobility when migration involves structures outside the
Region of residence. Providers in Northern regions are generally considered higher quality than
their equivalent in the South and this seems to be confirmed by works (see for instance Fabbri and
Robone (2010)) showing that the proportion of patients searching for hospital care outside of their
LHUs of residence (exit rate) was higher for poorer Regions, with variation according to the type
of care (more severe for patients with cancer).
3.2 Medical Malpractice: Legal Elements, the Insurance Market, and Regional Choices
Italy possesses no specific statute law to regulate the physician-patient relationship, although at-
tempts have been made. Therefore the physician-patient relationship is regulated mostly by judge-
made law just like in the United States, in particular through the jurisprudence developed by the
Court of Cassation (the higher court for civil and criminal jurisdictions). The duties of a medi-
cal care provider (staff member, public or private hospital employee or independent practitioner)
towards the patient are interpreted as contractual obligations as far as liability is concerned. Tort
law liability rules (responsabilità aquiliana) are not applicable here; the regulation of doctors and
hospitals’ position before patients is formally regulated by principles of contract law (Arts. 1218,
1176, and 2236 of the Civil Code).13
Injured patients can find compensation not only through the civil justice but also through the
criminal system.14 As a matter of fact, criminal judges can decide over the compensation due to
medical liability even when the main indictment is criminal (i.e., minor or major personal injury)
(Garoupa and Grembi (2010)). Public health care providers (LHUs, IHs, RHs, THs, and hospitals
directly managed by LHUs) are not legally obliged to insure for medical malpractice themselves,
but they must provide insurance for their medical personnel. The insurance covers professional
liability against third-parties.15 According to the data released by the Italian Association of Insur-
ance Companies (ANIA), during the period 2000-2008 there were 13-14 compensation requests for
every 100 physicians, with an average paid damage of 39,779 euro (2005 data) and an increasing
trend between 1995 and 2004.16 The ratio between the filed suits and the number of compensation
13The main implication, in liability terms, is related to: 1) the burden of proof, which is on the defendant (physician or
hospital) (Art. 1218 of Civil Code); 2) applicable provisions on professional diligence requirements (Art.1176 of Civil
Code); 3) on the liability of an employee (Art. 2236 of Civil Code); and 4) the statute of limitations, currently ten years,
rather than the standard five years for compensation claims not originating from a contract. For further detail, see Garoupa
and Grembi (2010).
14Besides, they can sue both the physicians and the hospital.
15According to the national contract signed on February 2005, the insurance needs to provide a coverage up to
1,549,370.68 euro for each case of damage, and up to 1,032,913.80 euro for each involved person.
16There are no national data available on the number of paid requests. Just to have a reference mean - even though
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requests seems to be quite low (significantly lower than 20%), although the only evidence on this
index is available for a very reduced number of regions (Amaral-Garcia and Grembi (2011)).
Like all public agencies, public health care providers (LHUs, IHs, RHs and THs) are not al-
lowed to go into the market to freely select an insurer: they need to open a call for tenders (public
procurement auctions) in order to contract out the coverage. The insurers operating in the Italian
market for medical malpractice are private companies, covering health care providers on the basis of
a yearly premium calculated as a percentage of the annual gross payroll of the public entity, which
can vary considerably (MdS, 2009). While the insurance premiums have substantially increased,
with a shift from occurrence-based liability insurance coverage to claims-made liability,17 their cal-
culation does not contain any reference to other activity related statistics such as the number of beds,
the average recovery length, the average number of surgeries, or the number of wards, to name only
a few. Hence, the lack of experience rating18 seems to play an important role also in the Italian
market. Starting from the end of the Nineties, Italian hospitals began to reveal a degree of uneasi-
ness about finding full and affordable coverage for medical liability from the private market. For
instance, Buzzacchi and Gracis (2008) summarize the status quo on insurance coverage for LHUs
and IHs from 2003 to 2006: out of the 308 collected calls for bids, the authors certify successful bids
only in 55 cases. A failure in a total of 53 cases was found: in 40 calls there was a lack of bidders
or a lack of qualified bids; in 13 cases, there was a new call for bids opened within one year after
the previous award. For the remaining 200 cases there was no information on the outcome of the
call. It is not possible to infer an increase in the lack of insurance availability for public providers
since time series statistics have not been provided, but Buzzacchi and Gracis (2008) suggest a low
degree of competition in the calls process and a scarcity of appropriate information monitoring on
the public agents’ side.19 In this scenario, 8 regions out of 21 implemented between 1997 and 2008
monitoring systems—Claims —for medical malpractice claims. In the same period, 2 out of 21
regions adopted a public insurance policy— InsMgmt —up to a compensation limit, which counts
as a deductible on the private market for medical malpractice insurance. In Table 1 the timing of the
policies and the Regions involved are specified.
plain comparisons should not be made given the differences in samples collections and healthcare systems- in Texas,
the number of compensation requests was equal to 20 in 2000 (Black, Hyman, Silver, and Sage (2005)). In Florida, in
2003, the median paid damage was equal to 150,000 dollar (300,000 the mean) (Vidmar, Lee, MacKillop, McCarthy, and
McGwin (2005)).
17While according to the former the injury is dated at the moment in which it took place, the latter sets the injury date
when the patient claims damage compensation. This is a de facto transfer of risks since the consequences of medical
malpractice injuries can become apparent even after several years.
18For a discussion of experience rating in medical malpractice insurance see Sloan (1990).
19Different attempts to estimate the cost of malpractice insurances for the Italian health care system have been done,
but often the findings are aggregated or they cover limited time periods (MdS, 2006). A 2005 estimation assesses in
almost 600 millions euro the expenditure for medical malpractice premiums in that year.
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Table 1- Institutional details- here
13 Regions never adopted any policies during the observation time, one region was under the
monitoring policy before 2001 (Provincia Autonoma di Trento, since 1997), and the main variation
for the monitoring policy is due to 7 Regions.
4 Evaluation framework
4.1 Econometric Strategy
To identify the effect, if any, of the two treatments (Claims and InsMgmt), we use a Difference in
Difference (DID) estimator that exploits the regional changes taking place at different points in time
as already adopted in the literature (Autor, Donohue III, and Schwab (2006); Acemoglu, Cantoni,
Johnson, and Robinson (2011)). Define Yirt as paid malpractice premiums or legal expenditures by
provider i delivering health care in Region r at time t. We estimate the following equation:
Yirt = γi + λt + δPost1t ∗ Claimsr + θPost2t ∗ InsMgmtr +X ′itβ + Z
′
rtω + εirt
where γi is a vector of health care provider intercepts and λt is a vector of year dummies, so
that we control for both structure specific trends and time aggregated shocks. Post1t is a dummy
equal to 1 if t ≥ t∗1 and 0 otherwise and Claimsr is equal to 1 for Regions adopting monitoring.
In this setting, t∗1 is equal to the adoption year of Claims. Post2t is a dummy equal to 1 if t ≥ t∗2
and 0 otherwise and InsMgmtr is equal to 1 for Regions adopting public insurance. Coherently to
the previous case, t∗2 is equal to the adoption year of InsMgmt. δ and θ represent the DID estimators
and they can be written according to the following standard equations
δ = {E[Yirt|Claimsr = 1, Post1t ≥ t∗1]− E[Yirt|Claimsr = 1, Post1t < t∗1]}
− {E[Yirt|Claimsr = 0, Post1t ≥ t∗1]− E[Yirt|Claimsr = 0, Post1t < t∗1]}
and
θ = {E[Yirt|InsMgmtr = 1, Post2t ≥ t∗2]− E[Yirt|InsMgmtr = 1, Post2t < t∗2]}
− {E[Yirt|InsMgmtr = 0, Post2t ≥ t∗2]− E[Yirt|InsMgmtr = 0, Post2t < t∗2}
In our model we take into account two vectors of control variables per healthcare unit, X
′
it,
and regions, Z
′
rt, which according to the literature on malpractice could have some impact on the
trend of malpractice premiums as well as on legal expenditures (see, for instance, Thorpe (2004)).
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Z
′
rt includes four regressors available at the regional level. The first set is composed by socio-
economic characteristics of the operational context of public health care providers which includes:
1) a weighted measure for the resident population per LHU calculated as the number of regional
residents divided by the number of LHUs operating within the Region. Although an approximation,
this variable provides an assessment of the patients set for which the LHUs have to buy or provide
medical services either directly or through other structures. Therefore, this variable is a proxy for
both dimensions and activity levels of LHUs, as well as the related structures that have to deal
with them; 2) a litigation rate index calculated as the regional ordinary civil proceedings filed in
First-Instance Courts weighted per 1,000 residents. It is important to include this variable because
it can be a direct driver of legal expenditures and claims requests; 3) the average duration of First
Instance cases resolution; and 4) the regional GDP to control for territorial differences in economic
conditions of both the patients and the providers (partially funded by regional taxes).
X
′
it groups structural characteristics of the providers. These include: 1) a set of dummies for the
type of healthcare provider (LHUs, IHs, THs and RHs), since different structures tend to have dif-
ferent management and organizational arrangements, which might affect insurance; 2) the amount
of medical personnel payroll, given that in Italy insurance companies set the premiums according to
a percentage of the payroll; 3) two indexes to consider patients’ mobility that providers need to man-
age. These indexes control for qualitative differences, which could affect the number of errors or
the probability of patients filing claims. Hence, we use: a) the ratio of revenues due to medical care
provided to residents from other public structures within the same region (entry rate), being higher
revenues potentially associated with higher quality; b) the ratio of expenditures due to services that
patients received by other public structures within the same Regions (exit rate).20 The latter is an
index for poor quality. In fact, it could not be interpreted differently: if exit rates were triggered by
long waiting list, for instance, it would mean that the deserted providers are characterized by low
quality level, being the length of waiting lists a proxy for quality.
4.2 Validity tests
The different performance in the terms of premiums expenditures could be driven by an anticipation
effect or, in some case, the reforms could have caught up a trend triggered by the operational con-
text characteristics. For instance, it could be the case that if hospitals do not get easily the insurance
coverage then their paid premiums amount decreased because the structures were not able to get
insurance in the first place, and we would have a decreasing trend independent from the treatments.
20We did not use the mobility rates from and to out of the Region structures, cause the reliability of the data is not very
accurate for this case. Generally the financial transfers are done among regions and not structures, even two years after
the cares delivery. Therefore the financial values reported under out of the region mobility is severally underestimated.
See Anessi Pessina (2011).
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Consequently, we run two falsification tests, one for each policy we have analyzed. For the monitor-
ing policy, we run a placebo test, using a fake measure of the treatment (see table notes) estimating
the following model
Yirt = γi + λt + δPost1t_fake ∗ Claimsr + θPost2t ∗ InsMgmtr +X ′itβ + Z
′
rtω + εirt
where Post1t_fake is equal to 1 when providers operate in Regions adopting Claims and
Post1t_fake ≥ t_fake with t_fake = mean(t∗−2001). If the “fake” treatment has a significant
effect it means that the regional policy cannot be regarded as responsible for whatever impact we
could detect with the model presented in the previous section.
For the second treatment, we use a validity test which is a Granger test (Autor, Donohue III, and
Schwab (2006); Angrist and Pischke (2009); Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson, and Robinson (2011))
running the following model
Yirt = γi + λt + δPost1t ∗ Claimsr + Σ3b=1θ−bDi,t∗2−b + Σ3a=0θaDi,t∗2+a +X
′
itβ + Z
′
rtω + εirt
where a represents years after the treatment of interest and b years before. This specification
allows to control for both pre and post trends, so to check also if causal effects get stronger or
weaker as time is passing. If our treatment is effective then we should have that the coefficients of
the pre-treatment years are not statistically significant while those of the post-treatment years should
be significant and supposedly with a negative sign.21
5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We collected data from the Ministry of Health (MdS), the Italian National Institute of Statistics
(Istat), and the Ministry of Justice, from 2001 to 2008, being the 2008 the last available financial
year in spring 2011. The Ministry of Health releases the annual balance sheets of each LHU, IH, RH,
and TH in every Region. From this source we obtain the two outcomes of interest: paid insurance
premiums and legal expenditures. Paid insurance premiums are a proxy for medical malpractice
liability premiums, since the share of the latter are not specified in the former aggregate measure.
However, since 2008, regional public providers need to declare the paid medical liability premiums,
distinguishing them from other insurance bought by the provider.22 A check on 2008 data shows
that medical liability premium counts on average for 84% of the total paid insurance premiums.
21Using the same test for the the monitoring policy would imply to loose several Regions from the check, so we decide
not to follow this way. See Table 1 for details.
22For instance, a hospital could buy a fire insurance or against burglary.
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All in all, the aggregate measure can be regarded as a good proxy for paid medical malpractice
premiums. Legal expenditures are an aggregate measure as well, and they are available only till
2007.
Figure 1 shows the per capita increase in paid premiums at the regional level. All Regions expe-
rienced an increase which is, on average, approximately equal to 120%. Regions opting for public
insurance suffer an increase in paid insurance premiums much lower than the national average: pre-
miums paid in Piemonte increased by 44% and in Friuli Venezia Giulia the increase was only of
13%.
Figure 1 - Premia per capita variation- here
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel from a minimum of 264 structures to a maximum
of 323 public healthcare providers. LHUs are the most represented type of healthcare structure in
the sample, followed by IHs, THs, and RHs (Table 2).
Table 2- Types per year- here
THs are paying, on average, higher premiums than the other structures, which seems to account
for their risk exposure related to, among other things, the interns. However, LHUs registered higher
increase rates: in 2001, a LHU paid on average 894 thousand euro in premiums while in 2008 this
amount was equal to 2,248 thousand euro (2009 euro) (Table 3). A similar trend is detectable for
legal expenditures (Table 4).
Table 3- Paid Premiums per type and year- here
Table 4- Legal Expenditures per type and year- here
In table 5 the number of structures affected by each policy are shown.
Table 5- Structures per treatment and year- here
At a first glance is apparent that paid premiums increased for all the structures in both the treated
and not treated sample, and this holds for both treatment types. Tables 6 and 7 show the average paid
premiums and legal expenditures for the treatment and control group. Overall, if we considered the
treatment on Claims, paid premiums increased on average 97% for the treated while this increase
was equal to 142% for the control group.
Table 6- Paid premiums treated and control under each policy- here
The trend is softer for structures paying premiums in Regions adopting the InsMgmt treatment:
the rate of variation for treated providers is equal to 56%, while non-treated providers experienced
an increase of 118% (Table 7).
Table 7- Paid Legal Expenditures treated and control under each policy- here
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We provide graphical analysis to show the trend of the variables of interest before and after
each Regional treatment introduction. For each policy we consider three years before the treatment
and three years after (the year of adoption is included). The trends seem to show evidence that
introducing monitoring on malpractice claims decreases paid malpractice premiums (Figure 2); the
adoption of the policy seems to have had no impact on legal expenditures (Figure 3).
Figure 2 and 3 - Premiums and Legal Expenditures first policy- here
Legal expenditures appear to increase after the introduction of the InsMgmt treatment (Figure
5). Nevertheless, this policy seems to have a decreasing effect on premium expenditures (Figure 4).
Figure 4 and 5 - Premiums and Legal Expenditures second policy- here
6 Empirical results
We run the models specified in sections 4.1 and 4.2 distinguishing between the entire sample and the
sample made by only LHU observations.23 The split is due to the fact that exit rate has a meaning
only for LHU, since it will be the LHU of the patient residency to pay for the care delivered to her
by another provider. In Tables 8 and 9, we show the results of the model described in section 4.1 for
both paid malpractice premium and legal expenditures. We present 4 regressions for each sample
adding controls in a stepwise way to show the robustness of the treatments’ estimates. Regression
(4) include litigation rates and duration for the entire sample and exit rate for the sample made only
by LHUs.
Tables 8-9- results- here
The impact of Post1 ∗ Claims (δ) is assessed in a range between -29 (Model 3) and -34%
(Model 4),24 while the impact of Post2∗InsMgmt (θ) is between -40 (Model 3) and -42% (Model
4). There are no significant effects on legal expenditures although the signs of the coefficients are
positive when we consider the introduction of public insurance. Yet, this is an important results for
us, because it means that legal expenditures are still mainly driven by other factors. A significant
effect on the paid premiums is exerted by the potential population of their patients and the paid
payroll, which do not affect in the same way legal expenditures. Mobility rates are not significant
even if their sign is consistent with what we could expect when the outcome is paid insurance:
negative for entry rate - which stands for good quality - and positive for exit rate - which stands
for bad quality. The signs revert when the outcome is legal expenditure with better providers, with
23We address the autocorrelation problem of DID (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)) clustering the errors.
24Model 4 includes observations untill 2007 given the use of the judiciary controls.
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more patients to treat, having also higher legal expenditures. However the coefficient is significant
only when the LHU sub-sample is considered.
Results of the validity tests shown in tables 10-13 confirm the robustness of results shown in
tables 8 and 9.
Tables 10-13- results of validity tests- here
Tables 10 and 11 show the results when the outcome is paid premiums. While Post1t_fake ∗
Claimsr is not significant, the dummies for the post-public insurance adoption shown a general
decreasing trend. In model 3 (Table 11) the decrease on paid premiums move from 40 (T1) to 47%
(T3), while if 2008 is dropped (Model 4) the trend is from 42 (T1) to 36% (T3), yet in this case
we are not considering the third year for the structures working in Friuli Venezia Giulia (see Table
1). When only LHU observation are considered (Models 7 and 8) the policy impact is definitely
growing from 37 (T1) to 43% (T3). There are no effects due to the validity tests on the legal
expenditures.
7 Conclusion
We showed that State initiatives to cope with multiple agency problems can be effective, evaluating
their impact on medical malpractice paid premiums at the level of healthcare provider in a mainly
public healthcare system. Such positive impact runs along two processes: on the one hand, improv-
ing the amount of available information on malpractice (at least on the legal side) produces cheaper
insurance. This might be due to an increased ability of local providers to extract the rent from the
private bidders, with a raise, for instance, in the public procurement quality indexes (e.g. number
of bidders), but it might also due to an increase of better weighted deductibles at the provider level
now more aware of their risk exposure. On the other hand, a public insurance solution, together
with a Regional level contracting out of the residual risk, decreases as expected insurance expen-
ditures. Given the amount of available information it is impossible to evaluate if this solution is
convenient by any means. We produce a check on legal expenditures, which did not increase as
a consequence of risk-pooling due to public insurance. Yet, the final check is represented by the
comparison between the amount of total compensations paid by the Region and the premium of a
competitive private insurance market. If, as usual in medical malpractice, claims ending up with
awarded compensations are significantly lower than the originally filed claims, the combo used by
the Italian Regions could be a useful benchmark.
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8 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Institutional Details
Regions 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Abruzzo
Basilicata
Bolzano
Calabria
Campania
Emilia Romagna C C C C C C
Friuli Venezia Giulia IM IM C IM C IM C
Lazio C C
Liguria
Lombardia C C C C C
Marche
Molise
Piemonte IM IM IM IM IM C
Puglia C C
Sardegna
Sicilia
Toscana C C C C
Trento C C C C C C C C
Umbria
Valle d’Aosta
Veneto
Note: C=Claims, IM=InsMgmt. Source: AGENAS (2009).
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Table 2: Structures Types per Year
Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
LHU 184 197 197 196 196 180 171 157 1,478
IH 52 68 65 61 63 63 63 63 498
TH 28 32 32 34 43 43 45 43 300
RH 0 0 20 22 21 20 21 21 125
Total 264 297 314 313 323 306 300 284 2,401
Note: LHU: Local Health Units; IH: Independent Hospitals; TH:Teaching Hospitals; and RH:Research Hos-
pitals.
Table 3: Average Paid Premium per Type and Year
Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
LHU 894 950 1,234 1,531 1,681 1,833 1,968 2,248 1,520
IH 1,023 1,022 1,220 1,518 1,602 1,734 1,857 1,844 1,482
TH 1,591 1,642 1,885 2,326 2,376 2,320 2,052 2,238 2,090
RH . . 564 692 903 881 989 922 828
Total 995 1,041 1,255 1,561 1,708 1,819 1,889 2,059 1,548
Note: Values are in 1,000 euros deflated at 2009. LHU: Local Health Units; IH: Independent Hospitals;
TH:Teaching Hospitals; and RH:Research Hospitals.
Table 4: Average Paid Legal Expenditures per Type and Year
Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
LHU 151 164 255 304 440 423 428 309
IH 83 122 146 284 222 185 193 178
TH 96 101 105 160 258 170 200 163
RH . . 61 142 174 95 190 129
Total 131 148 205 273 358 319 334 256
Note: Values are in 1,000 euros deflated at 2009. LHU: Local Health Units; IH: Independent
Hospitals; TH: Teaching Hospitals; and RH: Research Hospitals.
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Table 5: Structures per Treatment and Year
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Claims
Non-Treated 262 296 294 246 240 212 174 137
Treated 1 1 20 67 83 94 126 147
Ins Mgmt
Non-Treated 263 297 314 284 282 265 259 252
Treated 0 0 0 29 41 41 41 32
Total Structures 263 297 314 313 323 306 300 284
Note: The total number of structures suffered some changes, namely due to mergers.
Table 6: Average Paid Premium per Year and Group
Year
Claims Ins Mgmt
Non-Treated Treated Non-Treated Treated
2001 810 1,090 986 856
2002 844 1,235 1,060 916
2003 1,011 1,493 1,283 1,063
2004 1,288 1,828 1,598 1,318
2005 1,505 1,908 1,767 1,304
2006 1,713 1,913 1,940 1,039
2007 1,765 2,003 2,031 993
2008 1,962 2,149 2,151 1,338
Total 1,370 1,708 1,611 1,100
Note: Values are in 1,000 euros deflated at 2009.
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Table 7: Average Paid Legal Expenditures per Year and Group
Claims InsMgmt
Year Non-Treated Treated Non-Treated Treated
2001 140 115 140 50
2002 164 131 162 46
2003 252 159 226 62
2004 310 238 304 75
2005 481 232 400 77
2006 396 248 355 94
2007 482 195 374 94
Total 325 190 285 72
Note: Values are in 1,000 euros deflated at 2009. Legal Expenditures are only
available until 2007.
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Figure 1: Paid Premium per capita 2001-2008
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Figure 2: Paid Premium of Treated under Claims
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Figure 3: Paid Legal Expenditures of Treated under Claims
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Figure 4: Paid Premiums of Treated under Insmgmt
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Figure 5: Paid Legal Expenditures of Treated under Insmgmt
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